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REPORT

Central and East European Law
Initiative (CEELI)*
Currency Exchange Controls: A Concept Paper
Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria**
A smoothly functioning currency exchange system is an important aspect of
a well-developed international economy. Ideally, such a system would not limit
the ability to trade in and convert other countries' currencies. For a variety of
reasons, however, a country often decides to impose currency exchange controls.
This concept paper describes the primary international obligations that impact
on a country's ability to impose currency exchange controls and the issues that
arise if a country decides to impose such controls.

I. International Monetary Fund Obligations
The primary international obligations concerning currency exchange controls
arise from the Articles of Agreement (the "IMF Articles") of the International
*The Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) is a public service project of the American
Bar Association designed to advance the rule of law and commercial law in the world by supporting
the law reforms underway in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States of the
former Soviet Union. Through various programs, CEELI makes available U.S. legal expertise and
assistance to emerging democracies that are in the process of modifying or restructuring their laws
or legal systems.
If you are interested in becoming involved in CEELI, contact: John C. Knechtle, Director of Legal
Assessments and Concept Papers, CEELI, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
**Prepared for CEELI by: Russell J. Bruemmer, Esq. (principal drafter); Luis Garcia-Campuzano,
Esq.; Professor Kenneth Hansen; Nancy A. H. Martin, Esq.; Katarina Mathernova, Esq. (principal
drafter); Lester Nurick, Esq.; Professor Stephen Zamora.
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Monetary Fund (the "Fund") and related materials.' The IMF Articles entered
into force in 1945 and were amended in 1969, 1978, and 1992.2 They govern
the activities of the 179 countries that are the Fund's members (as of November
1994).
A.

ARTICLE IV-EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENT OBLIGATIONS

Members' exchange arrangements must be maintained in conformance with
Article IV of the IMF Articles, entitled ObligationsRegardingExchange Arrangements. The general obligations of members are set forth in Article IV, Section
1:
General obligations of members. Recognizing that the essential purpose of the
international monetary system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange
of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic
growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of the orderly
underlying conditions that are necessary for financial economic stability, each member
undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange
arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each
member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of
fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard
to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial
conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order
to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section.
These obligations focus on exchange arrangements rather than on particular
exchange rates. Prior to the Second Amendment in 1978, the only type of exchange
arrangement permitted by the IMF Articles was a par value system with gold
(or the U.S. dollar as a proxy for gold) as the common denominator. The Second
Amendment entirely abolished gold and the par value system based on gold from
the international financial structure. Thus, a system based on gold is now the
only type of arrangement prohibited by the IMF Articles.
Article IV, Section 2 describes four types of exchange arrangements that a
member may select:
3
* external valuation based on a currency's relationship to the SDR;
1. These related materials include resolutions of the Fund's Board of Governors and decisions
of its Executive Board. Other sources of international obligations include bilateral agreements and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
2. The effect of the Third Amendment, adopted in 1992, is explained in n.9 infra.
3. The SDR, or special drawing right, is a composite currency based on a basket of five currencies
(the U.S. dollar, German mark, Japanese yen, French franc, and the British pound). The SDRs,
which may generally be held only by Fund members and not by private parties, are used by monetary
authorities as a unit of account against which the values of other currencies are expressed. They are
utilized as reserve assets by their holders. The Fund quotas for each country are computed in SDRs.
VOL. 29, NO. 1
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another denominator
external valuation based on a currency's relationship to
4
(other than gold), e.g. another member's currency;
* a cooperative arrangement in which external valuation is based on the currency's relationship to the currency of two or more members; or
* a cooperative arrangement in which external valuation is based on the currency's relationship to the currencies of other members.
The IMF Articles also allow "other exchange arrangements of a member's choice."
An example of a cooperative arrangement is the European Monetary System
("EMS"). The EMS was established in the late 1970s and was based on the
understanding that EMS members would maintain the value of their currencies
against the other members' currencies within a prescribed range. If the value of
a member's currency approached the top or the bottom of the range, intervention
by the member's central bank was required to stabilize the currency. 5
"

Also, some other international financial institutions use SDRs to denominate the amount of their
loans. For example, International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, denominates their credits in SDRs. Otherwise, the use of the SDR as a unit of account in private transactions
has been very limited.
4. According to the 1994 IMF Annual Report, the U.S. dollar and the French franc are the
most popular single currencies used for external valuation of other countries' currencies ("pegging").
Other currencies used for pegging include the Indian rupee, the Australian dollar, the South African
rand, and the German mark.
5. The European Monetary System was established in the late 1970s to promote economic
integration and currency stability among the EC members. It was established by the central banks
of the then eight EC members after the Second Amendment to the IMF Articles eliminated the par
value system as the measure of exchange rate controls. Until the September 1992 currency crisis in
Europe, eleven of the twelve members of the EC were members of the EMS. (Greece does not
participate in the EMS at this time. Among countries that are not EC members, Norway has linked
its currency to the ECU and has voluntarily assumed the obligation of maintaining a maximum of
2.25 percent fluctuation of its central rate with the ECU.) At that time, Britain and Italy suspended
their membership in the EMS.
The EMS is built on four main components: (i) the exchange rate mechanism ("ERM"); (ii)
financing facilities to support the stability of the participating currencies and help the members to
meet their obligations to maintain exchange rates within the prescribed margins; (iii) a special European currency unit ("ECU"); and (iv) the coordination of exchange rate policies against third,
nonparticipating currencies. (For more detailed explanation of the EMS see David P. Valenti, Currency Unification in the European Economic Community: The Mechanics, Politics, and Probability
for Success, 28 INT'L LAW. 1039 (1994).) Each member commits to maintain exchange rates that
do not fluctuate outside prescribed parameters between its currency and that of each other member.
Members were obliged to maintain their exchange rates within a 2.25 percent trading band, the
so-called parity grid, above or below the bilateral central rates against other participating currencies.
(Before the recent currency crisis, Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom were already exceptions;
their exchange rates were maintained within a margin of fluctuation of 6 percent.)
During the summer of 1993, however, the ERM collapsed as Germany's relatively high interest
rates exerted a downward pressure on the French franc and other currencies. Central banks tried
to prop up the other currencies against the German mark, but they failed to hold back the pressures
of the market. In early August of 1993, European Community finance ministers and central bank
chiefs agreed to expand the trading bands of their currencies from the 2.25 percent permissible
fluctuation to 15 percent. This agreement was intended to preserve the structure of the EMS while
allowing the currencies to fluctuate much more freely in reaction to market pressures. The ERM
crisis demonstrates the difficulty in trying to maintain currency rates without closely coordinating
other areas of economic policy.
SPRING 1995
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In addition to the IMF Articles, the Fund's Executive Board, in 1977, adopted
the following
principles (amended in 1987 and 1988) to govern a member's
6
obligations:
A. A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international
monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjust7
ment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.
B. A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter
disorderly conditions which may be characterized, interalia, by disruptive
short-term movements in the exchange value of its currency.
C. Members should take into account in their intervention policies the interests
of other members, including those of the countries in whose currencies
they intervene.
B. ARTICLE VIII-SPEcIFIC PROHIBITIONS

Other provisions of the IMF Articles also contain more specific requirements on
exchange controls. Article VIII prohibits multiple and/or discriminatory exchange
rates and governs certain activities of member countries undertaken without the
approval of the Fund. (These topics are discussed more extensively in Sections
II.A and II.B, respectively, of this memorandum.)
In general, Article VIII, Section 2(a) also prohibits a member from placing
restrictions on current internationaltransactions without the approval of the
Fund. 8 On the other hand, Article VI, Section 3, points out that members
may generally restrict capital transfers as long as such restrictions are not
inconsistent with the obligations under Article VIII, Section 2 and the other
provisions of the IMF Articles. The important distinction is between current
transactions and capital transactions: the former are not to be restricted, but
the latter may generally be limited in any manner that is consistent with other
Fund obligations.
Apart from setting mandatory fluctuation margins, now significantly broadened, one of the most
significant features of the EMS system that distinguishes it from the IMF regime is the obligation
on the part of the EMS members and their central banks to intervene when necessary to reduce
fluctuations of the respective exchange rates. This is usually done either by buying and selling the
currency that hit the top or the bottom of the obligatory range or by raising or lowering domestic
interest rates.
6. Decision No. 5392-(77/63), April 29, 1977, as amended by Decision No. 8564-(87/59),
April 1, 1987, and Decision No. 8856-(88/64), April 22, 1988, in Selected Decisions and Selected
Documents of the InternationalMonetaryFund ("Selected Decisions") at 7, 18th issue, Washington,
D.C. (1993).
7. This principle is identical with obligation (iii) of Article IV, Section 1, entitled General
obligationsof members.
8. A limited exception to the prohibition of restrictions on current account payments is contained
in Decision No. 144-(52/51), August 14, 1952, in Selected Decisions at 370, 18th issue, Washington,
D.C. (1993). This exception allows "payment restrictions for security reasons," because the Fund
"does not . . . provide a suitable forum for discussion of the political and military considerations
leading to [the imposition of such restrictions.]" Id.
VOL. 29, NO. 1

CEELI REPORT: CURRENCY EXCHANGE CONTROLS

261

These terms correspond more or less to items in the current account and capital
account of the balance of payments, although differences have been established
through IMF practice. Thus, definitional issues are important, and a member
may need to consult the Fund on the definition of "current transactions" for
purposes of Article VIII. (This topic is discussed in more detail in Section II.C
of this memorandum.)
In addition, Article VIII obliges members (i) to buy, in certain circumstances,
balances of its currency held by another member (Section 4); (ii) to furnish
information regarding a member's balance of payments, and currency exchange
and fiscal policies, upon the request of the Fund (Section 5; see also Section II.F
of this paper); (iii) to consult with other members regarding existing international
arrangements (Section 6); and (iv) to cooperate with the Fund and other members
in "promoting better international surveillance of international liquidity" and
putting the SDRs in the position of "principal reserve asset in the international
monetary system" (Section 7).
C.

ARTICLE XIV-TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A new Fund member that believes it cannot meet all of its obligations under
the IMF Articles may "avail itself" of a "transitional arrangement" under Article
XIV. Thus, a new member may notify the Fund that it is not "prepared to accept
the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4,'--in effect, excluding itself
from the application of those provisions. Under a transitional arrangement, the
member may also "maintain and adapt to changing circumstances the restrictions
on payment and transfers for current international transactions that were in effect
on the date on which it became a member." Article XIV, Section 2.
Transition arrangements are not unlimited, however. Article VIII, Section 2
describes the member's obligations:
Members shall, however, have continuous regard in their foreign exchange policies to
the purposes of the Fund, and, as soon as conditions permit, they shall take all possible
measures to develop such commercial and financial arrangements with other members
as will facilitate international payments and the promotion of a stable system of exchange
rates. In particular, members shall withdraw restrictions maintained under this Section
as soon as they are satisfied that they will be able, in the absence of such restrictions,
to settle their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly encumber their
access to the general resources of the Fund.
D.

OTHER PROVISIONS

A Fund member need not obtain the Fund's concurrence to select an exchange
arrangement, but the choice must be consistent with the member's obligations
under the IMF Articles. In addition, the Fund exercises "surveillance" authority
over the international monetary regime and exchange rate policies of particular
countries to ensure the effective operation of those policies. If a member country
fails to fulfill any obligations under the IMF Articles, the Fund has the authority,
SPRING 1995

262

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

pursuant to Article XXVI, Section 2(a), to "declare the member ineligible to use
the general resources of the Fund." 9 If the failure continues beyond a reasonable
period, an eighty-five percent majority of the IMF's total voting power may
require the member to withdraw from the Fund.
If a Fund member experiences balance of payments difficulties, the Fund may
provide assistance through stand-by arrangements." oEach stand-by arrangement
is separately negotiated with the Fund. Under such an arrangement, a member
country is granted access to the Fund's resources consisting principally of the
currencies of Fund members for a negotiated period of time, usually a year but
not exceeding five years."
The Fund resources are not automatically available to a member country; they
are rather available only upon the member's agreement to follow Fund-approved
policies "intended to help the member overcome balance 3of payments difficulties." 2 This principle is referred to as "conditionality."
The prerequisite for obtaining a stand-by arrangement, as well as for a member's continued ability to draw on the Fund's resources under the arrangement,
is the fulfillment of certain performance criteria, including macroeconomic goals
and prohibitions of certain currency restrictions. A member's approach to dealing
with the performance criteria is outlined in the member's economic program that
the member negotiates with the Fund and communicates to the Fund via a letter
of intent signed by the member's minister of finance and/or the governor of its
central bank. "4 The Fund often raises issues relating to exchange controls (i.e.,
9. The Third Amendment to the IMF Articles adopted a new subsection to Article XXVI,
Section 2, under which a member's voting and certain related rights could be suspended by the Fund
if the member, after being declared ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund, continued
its failure to fulfill the IMF Articles' obligations.
10. Article XXX(b) of the IMF Articles defines stand-by arrangements as:
[A] decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that it will be able to make
purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the terms of the
decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount.
11. An alternative to stand-by arrangements are the so-called extended arrangementswhich may
be used for as much as ten years under a special policy called Extended Fund Facility.

12. Stephen Zamora, Guidelines on Conditionality, in
391-392 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 1990).

BAsIc DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC LAw

13. In addition to stand-by arrangements, in April 1993, the Fund established a so-called Systemic
Transformation Facility ( 'STF") under which it provides financial assistance to members experiencing balance of payments difficulties due to severe disruptions in their traditional trade. Under the
STF, members could receive a maximum of 50 percent of their quota in two equal purchases (tranches).
The STF was primarily designed to cope with balance of payment disruptions in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union stemming from the break-up of their traditional non-market-based trade.
The STF, which is designed as a transitional facility, shall expire on December 31, 1994. Executive
Board Decision No. 10348-(93/61) STF, adopted April 23, 1993.
14. The Fund's general policies for standby agreements are entitled Guidelines on Conditionality
and were adopted by the Fund's Executive Board Decision in 1979.
Guidelines on Conditionality
The Executive Board agrees to the text of the guidelines on conditionality for the
use of the Fund's resources and for stand-by arrangements as set forth [below].
Decision No. 6056-(79/38) March 2, 1979
VOL. 29, NO. I
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liberalization of exchange controls and elimination of discriminatory currency
practices) in the negotiations of performance criteria.
Unlike loan agreements with the World Bank, these stand-by arrangements
are not considered international agreements by the Fund. Thus, a member's
Use of Fund's General Resources and Stand-by Arrangements
1. Members should be encouraged to adopt corrective measures, which could be
supported by use of the Fund's general resources in accordance with the Fund's
policies, at an early stage of their balance of payments difficulties or as a precaution
against the emergence of such difficulties. The Article IV consultations are among
the occasions on which the Fund would be able to discuss with members adjustment
programs, including corrective measures, that would enable the Fund to approve
a stand-by arrangement.
2. The normal period for a stand-by arrangement will be one year. If, however, a
longer period is requested by a member and considered necessary by the Fund
to enable the member to implement its adjustment program successfully, the
stand-by arrangement may extend beyond the period of one year. This period in
appropriate cases may extend up to but not beyond three years.
3. Stand-by arrangements are not international agreements and therefore language
having a contractual connotation will be avoided in stand-by arrangements and
letters of intent.
4. In helping members to devise adjustment programs, the Fund will pay due regard
to the domestic social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and the
circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of payments
problems.
5. Appropriate consultation clauses will be incorporated in all stand-by arrangements.
Such clauses will include provision for consultation from time to time during the
whole period in which the member has outstanding purchases in the upper credit
tranches. This provision will apply whether the outstanding purchases were made
under a stand-by arrangement or in other transactions in the upper credit tranches.
6. Phasing and performance clauses will be omitted in stand-by arrangements that
do not go beyond the first credit tranche. They will be included in all other stand-by
arrangements but these clauses will be applicable only to purchases beyond the
first credit tranche.
7. The Managing Director will recommend that the Executive Board approve a
member's request for the use of the Fund's general resources in the credit tranches
when it is his judgment that the program is consistent with the Fund's provisions
and policies and that it will be carried out. A member may be expected to adopt
some corrective measures before a stand-by arrangement is approved by the Fund,
but only if necessary to enable the member to adopt and carry out a program
consistent with the Fund's provisions and policies. In these cases the Managing
Director will keep Executive Directors informed in an appropriate manner of the
progress of discussions with the member.
8. The Managing Director will ensure adequate coordination in the application of
policies relating to the use of the Fund's general resources with a view to maintaining the nondiscriminatory treatment of members.
9. The number and content of performance criteria may vary because of the diversity
of problems and institutional arrangements of members. Performance criteria will
be limited to those that are necessary to evaluate implementation of the program
with a view to ensuring the achievement of its objectives. Performance criteria
will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary
to implement specific provisions of the Articles or policies adopted under them.
Performance criteria may relate to other variables only in exceptional cases
when they are essential for the effectiveness of the member's program because
of their macroeconomic impact.
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departure from a specific portion of the letter of intent is not considered, and
does not have the consequences of, a breach of such an agreement. Nevertheless,
failure to adhere to the conditions of a stand-by arrangement can have significant
consequences in dealing with the Fund or other financial institutions. Thus, compliance with the conditions of stand-by arrangements may be a necessary precondition to recognition by the world financial community, including development
and commercial banks, that the country can be regarded as a safe borrower.5

II. Significant Issues in Currency Exchange Control
The implementation of a currency exchange system that complies with the
requirements described in the preceding section can be very complicated. (These
complications increase if the country is experiencing economic problems such
as balance of payments deficits or liquidity shortfalls.) Moreover, a country's
currency exchange laws have both national and international implications. Thus,
a country's currency exchange control mechanisms are intertwined with many
other aspects of that country's legal regime.
This section describes a number of key issues that must be addressed in adopting
a currency exchange control mechanism. Each issue is described in relatively
basic terms, and then, if possible, examples or alternatives are identified. This
list of issues should not be viewed as exhaustive but is intended to illustrate the

10. In programs extending beyond one year, or in circumstances where a member
is unable to establish in advance one or more performance criteria for all or part
of the program period, provision will be made for a review in order to reach the
necessary understandings with the member for the remaining period. In addition,
in those exceptional cases in which an essential feature of a program cannot be
formulated as a performance criterion at the beginning of a program year because
of substantial uncertainties concerning major economic trends, provision will be
made for a review by the Fund to evaluate the current macroeconomic policies
of the member, and to reach new understandings if necessary. In these exceptional
cases the Managing Director will inform Executive Directors in an appropriate
manner of the subject matter of a review.
11. The staff will prepare an analysis and assessment of the performance under programs supported by use of the Fund's general resources in the credit tranches in
connection with Article IV consultations and as appropriate in connection with
further requests for use of the Fund's resources.
12. The staff will from time to time prepare, for review by the Executive Board,
studies of programs supported by stand-by arrangements in order to evaluate and
compare the appropriateness of the programs, the effectiveness of the policy
instruments, the observance of the programs, and the results achieved. Such
reviews will enable the Executive Board to determine when it may be appropriate
to have the next comprehensive review of conditionality.
Source of text: Selected Decisions of the InternationalMonetaryFund and Selected Documents, 13th
Issue, April 30, 1987, at 27-29 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
15. For example, usually the World Bank does not provide adjustment (balance of payment
support) lending to its borrowing members without a Fund stand-by arrangement in place or at least
under negotiation.
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kinds of issues that should be considered in more detail before currency exchange
controls are adopted or amended.

A.

MULTIPLE CURRENCY PRACTICES

Article VIII, Section 3 of the IMF Articles prohibits Fund members from
engaging in "multiple currency practices . . . except as authorized by [the IMF
Articles] or approved by the Fund." As noted this prohibition only applies to
members who have accepted the obligations of Article VIII. As of April 30,
1994, 89 members have accepted the obligations of Article VIII.
A "multiple currency practice" exists when exchange rates for a Fund member's currency differ among different categories of exchange transactions.16 Certain market driven variances-e.g., for purchases and sales or for spot or forward
transactions-are not considered multiple currency practices. "Black market"
rates that differ from official rates are also generally not considered multiple
currency practices unless they are officially sanctioned or are so pervasive as
to be implicitly sanctioned. 7 But an official structure that establishes different
exchange rates for different transactions, or other official actions that have the
effect of creating such differentiation (e.g., taxes, subsidies, etc.), may be found
to be a multiple currency practice."i
Developing countries have often resorted to multiple exchange rates to combat
balance of payment difficulties, macroeconomic instability, and/or lack of foreign
currency reserves. Multiple rates are often used to favor certain types of "government-approved" uses of foreign exchange and to discourage other uses. Until
recently, a hallmark of all centrally planned economies was a multitude of exchange rates for different classes of transactions, for legal enterprises engaged
in favored activities, and for particular individuals. It may be difficult to eliminate
all such differentiation on an immediate basis.
Moreover, a country may find it necessary to impose multiple exchange rates
even after a set of singular rates has been in existence for a certain period. The
example of Mexico, a member of the Fund which introduced exchange controls,
including multiple exchange rates, in 1982, is illustrative. The Banco de Mexico
introduced two basic exchange rates: a general rate and a preferential rate for
priority transactions. In addition, the Banco de Mexico had the authority to set
special exchange rates according to the country's needs. Apart from the official
rates, there were unofficial or "coyote" rates in Mexico as well as the United
States. After the introduction of multiple rates and accompanying strict currency
controls, Mexico entered into negotiations with the Fund, which, de facto, ap16. Joseph Gold, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 252 (ABA

Sec. of Int'l Law and Practice, 1988).
17. See Stephen Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: A Case Study in the Application of the
IMF Rules, 7 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 103, 106 (1984).

18. See Gold, supra note 16, at 252.
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proved the controls without imposing any sanctions on Mexico. Under the influence of the Fund, however, Mexico lifted some of the restrictions and simplified
its multiple exchange rate system.
Because there is no requirement in the IMF Articles or the Executive Board
decisions of a Fund approval prior to an imposition of a restrictive currency
regime by a member country, "the Fund is forced by circumstances to react tofaits
accomplis, as it apparently was in the case of Mexico."19 The Fund's approval of
Mexico's currency controls and restrictions never took the form of an explicit
public statement, and its eventual acceptance resulted from negotiations between
the Mexican government and the Fund.
B.

DISCRIMINATORY CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS

Article VIII, Section 3 also prohibits Fund members who have accepted Article
VIII from engaging in "discriminatory currency arrangements." Although there
is significant overlap (and often confusion) between the categories of "multiple
currency practices" and "discriminatory currency arrangements," the two are
distinct concepts that may encompass slightly different types of behavior. Moreover, according to the Fund's former General Counsel, Sir Joseph Gold, the
Fund "observes a far more rigorous opposition to discriminatory currency ar20
rangements than to multiple currency practices."
Sir Joseph Gold defines discriminatory currency arrangements as "arrangements by a member to discriminate through its exchange system for the benefit,
or to the detriment, of another member or members." 2' The concept prohibits
"arrangements by a member that discriminate against another member or other
members by means of unequal treatment through the exchange system."2 Thus,
the prohibition reaches to any practice that either discriminates against or favors
another member or members to the exclusion of the other members of the Fund.
C. CURRENT/CAPITAL ACCOUNT DISTINCTIONS

Currency convertibility refers to the ability to purchase and sell foreign currency, at fixed or fluctuating exchange rates, without any administrative restrictions.23 Ideally, a country's economy should function without any restrictions on
convertibility. Often, however, developing countries find it necessary to impose

19. Zamora, supra note 17, at 120.
20. Gold, supra note 16, at 280.
21. Id. at 281.
22. Id.
23. Joshua E. Greene & Peter Isard, Occasional Paper No. 81, Currency Convertibility and
the Transformation of Centrally Planned Economies, IMF, June 1991, at 3. Historically, currency
convertibility meant the freedom and capacity to convert money into gold at set exchange rates.
VOL. 29, NO. 1
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restrictions on currency conversion until their economies can function with convertibility .24
The IMF Articles, and the scholarly research in this area, distinguish between
conversions for current account transfers and those for capital account transfers 25
.
Thus, Article VIII, Section 2(a) prohibits Fund members from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for "current international transactions" without
the approval of the IMF. By contrast, Article VI, Section 3 recognizes the right
of member countries to maintain "such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements," as long as they do not "restrict payments for
current transactions. -26
Distinguishing between payments for current transactions and capital transfers

may be difficult. As defined in Article XXX(d) of the IMF Articles, "payments for
current transactions means payments which are not for the purpose of transferring
capital." Among the examples of current account payments are those due in
connection with foreign trade and "current business, including services" as well
as moderate remittances for family living expenses. In addition, however, current
account payments include such quasi-capital items as "payments due as interest

on loans and as net income from other investments" and "payments of moderate
amounts for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments."
Countries that attempt to regulate capital transfers will need to take account
24. For a recent study of such arrangements, see generally Eduardo Borensztein & Paul R.
Masson, Exchange Arrangements of Previously Centrally PlannedEconomies, Part II of Occasional
Paper 102, Financial Sector Reforms and Exchange Arrangements in Eastern Europe, IMF, February
1993 at 37-56.
25. Current account convertibility brings about, according to Greene and Isard, both benefits
and risks to a country with an economy in transition from a centrally planned to a market system.
Among the benefits are increased access to technology and consumption items, as well as increased
competitive pressures through creating a competitive environment and promoting production. Among
the risks are reductions in real wages, unemployment, and idle production capacities.
Capitalaccount convertibility also generates both benefits and risks. On the one hand, it encourages
direct investments and attracts foreign capital, management and technology. On the other hand, it
enables great outflow of domestic capital and may increase macroeconomic instability caused by
short-term speculative movements of capital across the borders.
See generally, Greene & Isard, supra note 23 at 5-8. Because the risks of introducing current account
convertibility are significant, the Fund economists have identified four macro and microeconomic
conditions that a country ideally should meet before abolishing all restrictions on current account
transactions: (i) an appropriate (neither too depreciated nor too appreciated) exchange rate that is
in harmony with balancing the country's international payments; (ii) a sufficient level of international
liquidity, including access to foreign financing, foreign exchange reserves, and foreign currency
holdings and assets of the country's citizens; (iii) macroeconomic stability, including price stability,
credible fiscal discipline, and firm monetary control; and (iv) an ability to respond and adjustment
to market prices. Because these four conditions are difficult for any country to meet, general convertibility for current account transfers may be desirable even if each of these conditions is not strictly
met. Id. at 9-12.
26. Some developed industrial countries have maintained capital account restrictions until quite
recently. For example, France abolished remaining restrictions on capital movements only on January
1, 1990. But see Gold, supra note 16, at 304-307 (a special rate of exchange for capital transfers
is, according to the IMF Staff, a "multiple currency practice.")
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of these definitions. Moreover, such countries should also be aware that private
parties may seek to characterize certain transfers as current transactions in order
to facilitate the movement or repatriation of investment.
As indicated above, new members are given the opportunity to avail themselves
of a "transitional arrangement," one aspect of which is maintenance of "restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions that were
in effect on the date on which it became a member." New members must,
however, abolish such restrictions "as soon as they are satisfied that they will
be able. . . to settle their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly
encumber their access to the general resources of the Fund." 27
D.

LIMITATIONS ON CAPITAL FLOW

Closely linked to the capital account convertibility is the issue of limitations
on capital flows. A country may impose limitations both (i) on residents and
their ability to invest abroad; and (ii) on nonresident investors and their ability
to repatriate investments made in the country as well as any profits and income
from those investments.
In regard to the former, most of the former centrally planned countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and the Slovak Republic,
restrict the ability of residents, individuals or legal entities, to obtain credits or
invest abroad. With respect to the latter type of restrictions, the situation is
different. Even if a country is not ready to eliminate all controls on capital
movements, it may nevertheless ease its restrictions in some specific areas, for
example, in order to encourage foreign investment. For example, many of the
former Eastern Bloc countries, including Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, allow
nonresidents to repatriate profits, compensation, and investment earnings. The
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic, in addition,
allow repatriation of the initial investments.
E.

INTERNAL CONVERTIBILITY

Internal convertibility refers to the ability of a country's residents (both individuals and enterprises) to convert holdings of domestic currency into foreign currency (and vice versa) and, thus, to maintain assets denominated in foreign currencies. These restrictions are typically resorted to by countries with balance of
payments problems and with limited reserves of freely convertible currencies.
Nothing in the IMF Articles prohibits a country from restricting the ability of
its residents to engage in such activities, and a number of countries have such
restrictions. 2s For example, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland,
27.
28.
internal
citizens

See IMF Articles, Article VIII, Section 2.
Mexico's experience with U.S. dollar bank deposits is illustrative of the risks of unrestricted
convertibility. In order to prevent capital flight, the Mexican Government encouraged its
to deposit dollars in Mexican banks (the so-called mexdollar deposits) by offering attractive
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Romania, and Russia all maintain some restrictions on the ability of residents
to convert their domestic currency into a foreign currency.2 9
Closely related to such direct restrictions are provisions that require residents
to repatriate and exchange some or all of their foreign currency acquired through
export proceeds or accruals of foreign exchange in general. Most of the countries
that had centrally planned economies, including the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine, require residents to
repatriate and surrender foreign currency proceeds.
Several countries, including the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania,
and Poland, distinguish between internal convertibility for individuals and
that for enterprises. For example, in the Czech and the Slovak Republics, and in
Poland, individuals have virtually unlimited ability to obtain and hold foreign
currency. They must, however, "repatriate" such currency, and open foreign
currency accounts only with banks in their respective countries. Accounts
abroad may be opened only with express permission from local authorities,
typically the state banks. Enterprises, on the other hand, must exchange all
foreign exchange proceeds from exports. They must hold accounts in banks
in the respective local currencies, and, when they need foreign exchange for
their business operations, they must repurchase foreign exchange from the
local authorized banks.
Limits on the import/export of certain goods or other trade provisions that
restrict imports/exports can affect internal convertibility. Countries undergoing
transition from centrally planned to market economies tend to impose import/
export reporting and/or licensing requirements as part of their transition schemes.
At the initial stages of transition, all the countries of Eastern and Central Europe
controlled the amount and content of goods imported or exported to or from the
countries. With the general liberalization of foreign trade in the past two years,
most of these countries, including the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary,
and Poland, have lifted many import/export restrictions and maintain them only
for selected, mainly strategic, items. This makes a workable currency control
regime all the more important.

F.

MONITORING MECHANISMS

1. IMF Level
Pursuant to Article XIV, Section 3 of the IMF Articles, the Fund annually
monitors the existence of currency restrictions inconsistent with Article VIII that
interest rates. When this failed to curb the flight of capital, the government enacted strict exchange
controls which, inter alia, immediately converted all mexdollar accounts into peso accounts at the
then applicable exchange rate. For a detailed discussion see Stephen Zamora, Peso-DollarEconomics
and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 99 (1984).
29. Indeed, only in recent years has the United States allowed its residents to maintain bank
accounts in the United States that were denominated in foreign currencies.
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are in force under Section 2 of Article XIV, authorizing transitional arrangements.
Any member state maintaining such restrictions must consult the Fund annually
"as to their further retention."
In addition, Article VIII, Section 5, entitled Furnishingof information, authorizes the Fund to request member countries to provide national data on all subjects
related to their fiscal, currency, investment, and import/export regime, and balance of payments, whenever the Fund "deems [it] necessary." This information
is made available to other members as, according to subsection 5(b), the Fund
acts "as a center for the collection and exchange of information on monetary
and financial problems."
2. National Level

Various procedures are used at the national level to monitor flows of capital
and goods across national borders. These vary from simple reporting requirements
to complex administrative procedures for securing authorizations or licenses.
With regard to reporting requirements, many industrialized countries require
reports on large flows of capital or capital goods. For example, United States
citizens have an obligation to declare in their custom forms any importation of
$10,000 or more in cash, travellers checks, or commercial papers when entering
the United States. In addition, the United States, Great Britain, and Switzerland
have imposed various monitoring obligations in connection with efforts to control
money laundering.
As an example of the latter, residents of several former Eastern Bloc countries,
including the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland, need authorizations of their central banks or ministries of finance in order to open bank accounts
abroad or obtain commercial credits from banks abroad.
G.

TRANSPARENCY/REPORTS

1. IMF Level

"Transparency" refers to the ability of those with an interest in the marketplace
to determine what laws apply and what decisions have been reached with respect
to those laws. Transparency is an important aspect of an efficiently functioning
currency exchange control system that conforms with existing international obligations. This transparency occurs at both the Fund level and the national level.
The Fund prepares reports, both annual and on an ad hoc basis, based on the
information received from members on the status of currency controls in their
countries and other related matters to the Fund. Pursuant to Article XII, Section
7, entitled Publicationof reports, the Fund annually publishes a statement of its
accounts and every three months publishes statements of its operations, transactions, and holdings of SDRs, gold, and currencies of its members. It also publishes
a yearbook entitled Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
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At the same time, pursuant to Section 8 of the same article, entitled Communication of views to members, the Fund may, at its discretion, communicate with
any member on an informal basis on any matter under the IMF Articles. Also,
a seventy percent majority of the total voting power may authorize the Fund to
publish a report on a member country regarding its economic and monetary
developments if they "tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the international
balance of payments of members."
In addition, the Fund makes decisions of its Executive Board and the Board
of Governors available in a publication entitled Selected Decisions and Selected
Documents of the InternationalMonetary Fund.
2. National Level
It is also extremely important that any domestic laws, rules, and regulations are
readily accessible and available to the public. Transparency of national exchange
controls is an area in which the Fund can be expected to exert influence as it
negotiates with a Fund member. To achieve this goal, countries usually publish
their laws and regulations in official gazettes before their effective dates.
Currency regulations and restrictions are, however, often carried out at an
administrative level (e.g., resolutions or decisions of the governors of the central
banks or ministers of finance) rather than through legislation passed through the
regular parliamentary process. It is, therefore, important that such administrative
measures are also available to the public, either in the same official gazette or
a separate publication. In addition, a country should make decisions of judicial
and/or administrative bodies implementing the domestic currency exchange controls and restrictions available to the public.
To increase accessibility, countries with official languages other than those
commonly used for international financial transactions should consider publishing
pertinent laws and regulations in at least one of those languages. For example,
Hungary's official gazette is simultaneously published in the Hungarian, German,
and English languages.
HI.

Country Analyses

The third part of this paper consists of comparative charts. The charts outline
provisions contained in the relevant laws and regulations in Bulgaria and several
other, similarly situated, Central and East European countries and former Soviet
republics. The charts, inter alia, include such issues as: the existence of multiple
and/or discriminatory exchange rates; restrictions on current and capital account
convertability; the existence of internal convertability for business and/or private
purposes; restrictions on currency flows both inward and outward; permissible levels of foreign capital participation; restrictions on repatriation of profits; and mandatory repatriation and/or surrender of export proceeds by countries' residents.
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